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REFERENCE PRICING: A SMALL AND MIGHTY SOLUTION
TO BEND THE HEALTH CARE COST CURVE
SRISHTI MIGLANI*
“Healthcare [is] . . . undoubtedly the most complex of all social systems.
Perturbations of complex systems always produce unintended and
unexpected consequences, even when
all we are doing is eliminating perversion”1
I. INTRODUCTION
There is no single antidote to the problem of rising health care
costs. These costs can be attributed to: the aging population; current
payment and delivery structures; administrative burdens; demand for newer
medical technology; lack of transparency in price and quality of care;
increased health care utilization; insurance benefit design; market
consolidation; high per-unit price of medical services; the legal, regulatory,
and tax environment; the current structure of the health care workforce; and
restrictions on the practice of medicine.2 With a multitude of cost drivers, it
is naïve to expect a one-size-fits-all solution. Unrealistic expectations can
create an unwelcoming atmosphere for strategies that only address one or
may be two of the factors that continue to make health care expenditures a
greater percentage of our gross domestic product (GDP). To reduce health
care costs, we need multiple strategies that, when combined, will address
the inefficiencies in health care and lessen the extensive control providers
have over prices of medical procedures and services.3
* Associate Counsel, Administrative and Civil Remedies Branch, Office of
Counsel to the Inspector General (OCIG), Office of Inspector General (OIG),
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). This article was written
during my studies at the Saint Louis University School of Law. I am presently
working at the DHHS, OIG. The opinions presented herein are those of the
author(s) and do not represent the views or policies of the DHHS OIG.
1
JOHN GOODMAN, PRICELESS 309 (2012).
2
What is Driving U.S. Health Care Spending: America’s Unsustainable
Health Care Cost Growth, BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR. 1, 17 (Sept. 2012), available
at
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/default/files/BPC%20Health%20Care%20Cost%20Drivers%
20Brief%20Sept%202012.pdf.
3
Trends in Health Care Cost Growth and the Role of the Affordable Care Act,
The
White
House
(Nov.
2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/healthcostreport_final_noembar
go_v2.pdf; Amitabh Chandra, Jonathan Holmes & Jonathan Skinner, Is This Time
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One strategy that has proven its effectiveness is reference pricing
(RP). RP is an insurance benefit design mechanism in which a “reference”
price is set for a specified service or procedure, which the health plan
sponsor uses to cap its contribution. The beneficiary is responsible for any
amount above the defined contribution.4 RP seeks to address the significant
price variations that exist for medical procedures and services. 5 RP
combines both consumer- and provider-targeted strategies to lower health
care costs. On the consumer side, RP originates from the consumer-driven
health care movement. It aims to put the consumer’s “skin in the game” to
help steer the health care market in the right direction. By giving the
insurers some clout, it aims to reduce providers’ market power and control
over the prices of medical services. This paper will examine how and why
RP shifts risks to consumers and why it is a more effective form of risk
sharing than the ones currently being used.
Different? The Slowdown in Healthcare Spending, THE NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON.
RESEARCH (2013).
4
Francois de Brantes et al., Reference Pricing and Bundled Payments,
CATALYST
FOR
PAYMENT
REFORM,
1
(Oct.
2013),
http://www.catalyzepaymentreform.org/images/documents/matchtochangemarkets.
pdf.
5
For example, the price for a colonoscopy varies from $800 to $3,160 in the
U.S., which is an approximately a 300 percent price variation. Colonoscopy,
HEALTHCARE BLUE BOOK (2012), http://consumerhealthchoices.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/10/Colonoscopy-HCBB.pdf; see also Elizabeth Rosenthal,
The $2.7 Trillion Medical Bill: Colonoscopies Explain Why U.S. Leads the World
in Health Expenditures, N.Y. Times, A1 (June 1, 2013) (discussing the price
variation of colonoscopies around the country); The Editorial Board, The Weird
World of Colonoscopy Costs, N.Y. Times SR10 (June 9, 2013). Castlight Health’s
price comparison tool for medical services across the nation shows that a lipid
panel costs $26 in Los Angeles, $40 in Phoenix, Arizona, $34 in Las Vegas,
Nevada, and $76 in Salt Lake City, Utah. Analysis Details Most and Least
Expensive Cities for Common Medical Services: Pricing for the Same Medical
Services is All Over the Map (Literally), Lipid Panel, CASTLIGHT HEALTH (Oct.
23, 2014), http://www.castlighthealth.com/price-variation-map/. This shows a price
variation of 192 percent between the price offered in Los Angeles and Salt Lake
City. The average price for a head/brain CT scan in Norfolk, Virginia is $1,230
with prices ranging from $218 to $1,703 and in Richmond, Virginia, the average
price is 1,307 with prices ranging from $218 and $2,009 (This price variation could
be the result of many factors which are not discussed here). Analysis Details Most
and Least Expensive Cities for Common Medical Services: Pricing for the Same
Medical Services is All Over the Map (Literally), Head/brain CT scan, CASTLIGHT
HEALTH (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.castlighthealth.com/price-variation-map/.
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Although RP’s application to procedures and services is a novel
concept, RP has been used in the international pharmaceutical market for
some time and has achieved success in lowering drug prices. RP’s success
in reducing overall costs for large U.S. employers that have implemented it
in their plan design has laid the groundwork for widespread adoption by
other similarly-situated employers. A 2013 survey conducted by Aon
Hewitt found that out of more than 1,230 employers surveyed, sixty-two
percent planned to adopt RP in the next three to five years.6 RP is here to
stay; however, its place and role in the current health care system has to be
understood and its limitations need to be acknowledged and monitored to
ensure it does not adversely impact the quality, access, and affordability of
care.
At this early stage, it is important to recognize that RP is not the
solution to address rising health care costs, it is merely one solution. Its
success and widespread adoption, however, should be accompanied by
cautious optimism. This paper argues that RP can be structured to reap its
price-saving potential, but it requires proper regulatory oversight to ensure
it does not negatively impact quality, affordability, and access to care. If
implemented in a systematic and cautious manner, it can become a useful
tool for employers and health plans, especially when combined with
bundled payments. Section II of this paper defines RP and explains its
origins in the consumer-driven health care movement. Section III
highlights RP’s application in the international market for pharmaceuticals
and domestic market for medical services and procedures. Sections IV
explores the short-term and long-term considerations respectively that
health plans need to examine and evaluate to implement RP appropriately
while balancing the interests of the consumer and cost-saving effects of RP.
Section V touches on the possibility of combining RP with bundled
payments.

6
Aon Hewitt 2013 Health Care Survey, AON HEWITT, 13 (June 11, 2014),
http://www.aon.com/attachments/human-capitalconsulting/2013_Health_Care_Survey.pdf; Another survey conducted by Towers
Watson and the National Business Group on Health also showed increased
adoption of RP in the coming years. Reshaping Health Care: Best Performers
Leading the Way, 18th Annual Towers Watson/National Business Group on Health
Employer Survey on Purchasing Value in Health Care, TOWERS WATSON/NAT’L
BUS. GRP. ON HEALTH, 20 (2013), http://www.towerswatson.com/enUS/Insights/IC-Types/Survey-Research-Results/2013/03/Towers-Watson-NBGHEmployer-Survey-on-Value-in-Purchasing-Health-Care?page=3.
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II. RP AND ITS ORIGINS
A. DEFINITION
RP is a type of defined contribution approach in which the plan
sponsor either pays a fixed amount or sets a limit for how much it will pay
towards the cost of a health care service. 7 If a plan member chooses a
health care provider or service that costs more than the limit set by the plan
sponsor, then the plan member has to pay the difference, which I will refer
to as the “gap price.”8 The price limit that is set by the plan sponsor is
called the “reference price.” 9 The insurer selects a service or procedure
(“reference-priced service” or “reference-price procedure”) for which it
wants to set a reference price. It negotiates the cost of a certain service or
procedure with the health providers in a defined geographic area. After
taking the average of the prices quoted by the providers, the plan sponsor
evaluates the quality of services provided by the different providers and
decides on a reference price.10
RP functions like a “reverse-deductible”: the health plan or
employer pays the initial part of the allowed cost and the consumer pays
the remainder of the charge for the care.11 Once established, the reference
7

Paul Fronstin, Reference Pricing for Health Care Services: A New Twist on
the Defined Contribution Concept in Employment-Based Health Benefits, EMP’T
BENEFIT
RESEARCH
INST.,
4
(Apr.
2014),
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/ebri_ib_398_apr14.refprcng.pdf.
Project
Millennial refers to RP as “micro-voucherization’ of health care.” Mike Miesen,
The “Micro-Voucherization” of Health Insurance: Can Reference Pricing Bend
the
Curve?,
PROJECT
MILLENNIAL
(June
27,
2013),
http://projectmillennial.org/2013/06/27/the-micro-voucherization-of-healthinsurance-can-reference-pricing-bend-the-curve/.
8
Id.
9
Amanda E. Lechner, Rebecca Gourevitch & Paul B. Ginsburg, The Potential
of Reference Pricing to Generate Health Care Savings: Lessons from a California
Pioneer, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, 1 (2013).
10
Id. at 3. Although quality determinations are difficult to conduct, CalPERS’
experiment with RP provides a blueprint for other insurers looking to adopt RP to
conduct their quality determinations. Also, it is important to acknowledge that
insurers might have an incentive to sacrifice quality for price. But for an insurer
looking to lower its costs for certain procedures by adopting RP, it is in the best
interests of the insurer to balance quality with price to ensure that its clients do not
have to go for repeat procedures or require more than usual follow-up care, which
in turn might result in higher overall costs for the insurer.
11
Fronstin, supra note 7, at 5.
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price becomes the maximum amount the insurer will pay, whether a patient
sees an in-network or out-of-network provider. “For out-of-network
services, the reference price is identical to a [usual, customary, and
reasonable (UCR)]-based ‘allowed amount.’”.” 12 But for in-network
services subject to RP, the reference prices are different than, and
essentially an override, of the previously negotiated prices for those
services.13
RP’s goals are three-fold: (1) to make the consumer an active
participant in choosing where to receive the health care services, while
being cognizant of the price; (2) to direct the plan members towards lowprice providers; and (3) to motivate high-price providers to lower their
prices to retain market share.14 An RP program can achieve its goals with
participation from insurers, providers, and consumers and the development
of processes that create a transparent and informed atmosphere. First, the
plan sponsor has to obtain pricing information from the providers for the
negotiated services. 15 Then the health plan sponsor has to inform
consumers about the reference prices and quality of care information for
the providers. Lastly, the plan sponsor must continuously monitor the
reference prices and quality of care to determine which providers to include
in its reference-priced network. Although the development of an RP
program might appear simple, it comes with several caveats and
preconditions for success, all of which will be discussed in Section V.
B. ORIGINS
Catalyst for Payment Reform—an independent, national nonprofit
organization that aims to effect change in the health care system—defined
reference pricing as a market-based approach that works at the

12

Jon Glaudemans et al., Reference Pricing and Network Adequacy
Standards: Conflict or Concord? HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Sept. 18, 2014),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/09/18/reference-pricing-and-network-adequacystandards-conflict-or-concord/.
13
Id.
14
Fronstin, supra note 7, at 5. As I discuss in Section V, putting the onus on
consumers has its disadvantages and those have to be recognized and
acknowledged in order for RP to become an acceptable and cost-saving tool for the
insurance industry.
15
How to Make Reference Pricing Work for Consumers, FAMILIES USA, 5
(June 2014), http://familiesusa.org/product/how-make-reference-pricing-workconsumers.
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“intersection of consumer engagement and provider contracting.” 16 RP
nudges consumers to take an active role in the purchase of health care
services, while forcing providers to provide the reference-priced procedure
or service at or below the reference price. By “restoring some control to the
health care purchasers and prompting providers of health care services to
innovate and compete on both price and quality,” RP addresses both the
demand and supply side of the health care system.
The health care system has actively reduced the amount of control
consumers have over prices, and has made the purchasing process a
passive, mindless experience. The consumer-driven health care (CDHC)
movement began to put consumers in the driver seat and help regain some
of the lost control. CDHC is based on the idea that patients can be better
economically-responsible consumers of health care if they are forced to pay
a larger share of the health care they consume.17
Additionally, CDHC is rooted in the belief that moral hazard is one
reason for rising health care costs.18 Moral hazard is “the intangible lossproducing propensities of the individual assured.”19 In other words, it is the
idea that an individual who possesses health insurance tends to consume
more medical care than an uninsured individual.
The RAND Health Insurance Experiment (RAND HIE) confirmed
the existence of moral hazard. The RAND HIE was a randomizedcontrolled study designed to answer whether free medical care, when
compared to insurance plans with cost-sharing requirements, leads to better
health.20 Three thousand five-hundred fifty-eight non-disabled individuals
between the ages of fourteen and sixty-one were assigned to a set of
insurance plans containing varying levels of cost-sharing for either three or
five years. The health effects of these groups were measured and
compared.21 The study found that “the more people had to pay for medical
16

Provider Market Power in the U.S. Health Care Industry: Assessing its
Impact and Looking Ahead, CATALYST FOR PAYMENT REFORM, 4 (Nov. 14, 2012),
http://www.catalyzepaymentreform.org/images/documents/Market_Power.pdf.
17
James C. Robinson & Paul B. Ginsburg, Consumer-Driven Health Care:
Promise And Performance, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS, w272, w278 (2009).
18
Id. at 18.
19
Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard; Comment, 58 THE AMER.
ECON. REVIEW 531, 535 (1968).
20
Robert H. Brook et al., The Effect of Coinsurance on the Health of Adults:
Results from the Rand Health Insurance Experiment, RAND CORP. i., v (1984).
21
Id. at 3. The people in the cost-sharing group were further divided further
into three groups: (1) individual deductible plan: “the family paid 95 percent of the
cost of all outpatient care for up to an annual out-of-pocket expenditure of $150
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care, the less they used. Adults who had to share the cost of care made
about a third fewer ambulatory visits and were hospitalized about a third
less often.” 22 While free health care “did not improve the health status
across the range of measures or income groups examined, it did confer
demonstrable benefits for patients with selected conditions that physicians
are trained to manage.” 23 The RAND HIE concluded that there is an
inverse relationship between cost sharing and consumption of health care.
The increase in consumption of health care is attributable to many factors,
including the effect of insurance on reducing the price from market price to
zero at the time of service, and the knowledge that an individual’s excess
usage is spread over all other purchasers. 24 Therefore, the RAND HIE
indicated that making the consumer more price-sensitive to the cost of
medical services at the point of service can be a solution to the problem of
moral hazard.25
Restoring control to the consumer, by itself, is not sufficient to
address the power imbalance in our health care system. The other problem
that needs to be addressed is the great market power that providers have
over the prices of health care services and procedures.26 With big hospital
per person ($450 per family)”; (2) intermediate coinsurance plan: “the family paid
25 or 50 percent of all health bills each year, inpatient and outpatient, until it had
spent 5, 10, or 15 percent of its income or $1000 (whichever was less)”; or (3)
income-related catastrophic plans: “the family paid 95 percent of its health bills up
to the same ceiling as in the intermediate plans.” Id. The effect of cost-sharing on
people’s health was evaluated by looking at the following eleven measures:
physical health, role functioning, mental health, social contacts and general health
ratings, smoking behavior, weight, cholesterol level, diastolic blood pressure level,
visual acuity, and an index of risk of dying from certain risk factors, specifically
systolic blood pressure, cholesterol, and smoking habits. Id. at vi.
22
Id at 25.
23
Id. at 28.
24
Pauly, supra note 19, at 532, 535.
25
Brook et al., supra note 20, at 25–28. Other research shows that moral
hazard does not explain why all kinds of health care expenditures. See John A.
Nyman, Is 'Moral Hazard' Inefficient? The Policy Implications Of A New Theory,
23 Health Affairs (2007). Nyman argues that moral hazard “makes sense for
cosmetic surgery or drugs to improve sexual functioning or designer-style
prescription sunglasses, but not for serious treatments such as coronary bypass
operations or organ transplants.” Id. Therefore, cost sharing mechanisms might not
be the solution to reduce health care consumption for those procedures which are
not prone to moral hazard. Id.
26
Katherine Baicker & Dana Goldman, Patient Cost-Sharing and Healthcare
Spending Growth, 25 THE J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 47, 53–54 (2011).
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chains and provider groups dominating most local markets, providers are
able to get extremely high rates from dominant insurers that feel compelled
to pay those high rates to maintain the providers in their networks. 27
Additionally, the consolidation of the health care market has increased the
monopoly power of the large providers and given them bargaining power
over insurers. 28 Insurers have little incentive to negotiate lower rates
because they know they can pass on the additional costs to consumers and
businesses.29 This market failure, resulting from insufficient competition,
has nurtured providers’ expectations of higher prices, which has, in turn,
not only adversely impacted the private insurance sector, but public
programs, as well. Diane Archer, Special Counsel and Co-Director of the
Health Care for All Project at the Institute for America’s Future, explains:
[T]he private health care marketplace will continue to set
excessive rates until they are stopped. These exorbitant
rates are not only hurting working people, they are also
driving up Medicare costs and imposing a massive burden
on taxpayers and the federal government. Doctors and
hospitals are conditioned to expect higher and higher rates
and demand higher payments from public programs.30
So in order to address the market failures that have not been corrected by
the market, insurers need to have greater bargaining power to dictate
prices. Even though the consolidation and merger wave cannot be stopped,
a market in which the providers and insurers can negotiate with
approximately the same amount of bargaining power can be created. As an
economic matter, the increased competition will hopefully reduce health
care prices for consumers and curb the growth of health care spending.31
Use of RP in the pharmaceutical, medical procedures, and medical services
markets has shown that (1) consumers can be empowered to have greater
control over their health care expenditures and (2) insurers and providers
27
Diane Archer, No Competition: The Price of a Highly Concentrated Health
Care
Market,
HEALTH
AFF.
BLOG
(Mar.
6,
2013),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/03/06/no-competition-the-price-of-a-highlyconcentrated-health-care-market/.
28
BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., supra note 2, at 17.
29
Id.
30
Diane Archer, No Competition: The Price Of A Highly Concentrated Health
Care Market, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (March 6, 2013).
31
See Lawrence C. Baker et al., Physician Practice Competition and Prices
Paid by Private Insurers for Office Visits, 312 JAMA 1653 (2014).
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can successfully use their respective market power to negotiate and bring
health care expenditures down to reasonable levels.
III. APPLICATION OF REFERENCE PRICING
A. PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
The history of RP in the pharmaceutical sector provides some
important insights into its potentials and shortcomings. The use of RP in
the pharmaceutical industry has been successful because of the lack of
significant heterogeneity between different drugs, and as a result, RP’s
implementation has been easier. The goal of using RP in the
pharmaceutical industry is to “reduce the price of [reference-priced]
products either through a relative decrease in the demand for high-priced
products (a demand-side approach) or through cuts in drug prices by
encouraging self-restraint (a supply-side approach).”32 The only difference
in its application in the pharmaceutical industry, compared to the market
for procedures and services, is the manner in which the reference price is
set for classes of interchangeable drugs. 33 Drugs are grouped by either
general referencing or therapeutic referencing. 34 Generic referencing
applies to only generically equivalent products with the same active
ingredient and formulation. 35 On the other hand, therapeutic referencing
only applies to drugs with different molecules for the same indication.36 A
third party payer sets a maximum reimbursement price for a group of
32

Jaume Puig-Junoy, What is Required to Evaluate the Impact of
Pharmaceutical Reference Pricing, 4 APPLIED HEALTH ECON. AND HEALTH POL’Y
87, 87 (2005).
33
M.N.G. DUKES ET AL., DRUGS AND MONEY: PRICES, AFFORDABILITY, AND
COST CONTAINMENT 85 (7th ed. 2002). “Several options exist [to determine classes
of interchangeable drugs]: one can for example limit the system to certain drug
categories, usually those representing a major share of a drug budget; one can
apply different criteria to the various classes in order to decide on the degree of
interchangeability of the drugs within each; and one can choose to introduce the
method gradually, experimentally or incrementally, perhaps in order to arrive
ultimately at a comprehensive reference system.” Id. at 86.
34
Patricia M. Danzon & Jonathan D. Ketcham, Reference Pricing of
Pharmaceuticals for Medicare: Evidence from Germany, The Netherlands, and
New
Zealand,
NAT’L
BUREAU
OF
ECON.
RES.,
2
(2003),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10007.pdf.
35
Id. at 3.
36
Id.
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pharmaceutical products called “clusters.” 37 If a patient chooses a drug
within the cluster, then he does not have to incur any out-of-pocket costs.38
Otherwise, the patient pays the difference between the reference price and
the reimbursement level set for the cluster.39
Before an RP system for drug pricing can be set up, the number
and scope of interchangeable drugs have to be defined, the manner in
which reimbursement levels for each individual class of drugs will be
calculated has to be formulated, a procedure to define the classes of drugs
and set reimbursement levels has to be determined, and methods to allow
exceptions have to be established.40
Some countries determine the reference price by comparing within
the domestic or international markets and using the weighted average of the
prices of drugs in the group as sold on the domestic market.41 In a market
with substantial generic competition resulting in large price differences
among products, the price of the cheapest generic product is used.42 Drug
classification techniques vary from country to country, and some use a
combination of these methods. 43 RP policies within a country can,
however, vary greatly by insurer. 44 The Netherlands, for example, uses
price comparisons from other countries with similar purchasing power,
such as France, Germany, Belgium, and the United Kingdom. 45 Setting
reimbursement levels can be a highly politicized process because of its
potential economic impact on the pharmaceutical industry. There is no easy
37

Puig-Junoy, supra note 32, at 87.
Id.
39
Id.
40
M.N.G. DUKES ET AL., supra note 33, at 86.
41
Id. at 87.
42
Id. at 85, 87. The ways in which countries set their reimbursement levels are
not limited to these two methods. For example, British Columbia uses the
reference drug that is “most cost-effective within its class,” based on scientific
evidence accepted by the national regulatory agency, as the standard. Id.
Netherlands, on the other hand, uses the defined daily dose to set the price for each
drug group within the Netherland’s pharmaceutical reference pricing system. Id.
43
Id. at 86–87.
44
The RP policies vary according to: “equivalence level and criteria;
determination of the reference price level; inclusion of patented drugs; therapeutic
groups included; system of exemptions from the co-payment associated with RP;
level and type of pre-existing co-payment; incentives for doctors and pharmacists;
price regulation system; number of producers competing in the market;
possibilities of parallel trade; relationship between domestic prices and price
regulation in other countries.”
45
DUKES ET AL., supra note 33, at 88.
38
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solution to take politics out of pharmaceutical price-setting because of the
size and power of the pharmaceutical industry. However, a market-based
solution that is overseen by a consumer-friendly regulatory framework can
work to counteract political forces.
The mechanisms in place to determine exceptions to RP are
fundamental to the pharmaceutical RP program. Due to the individualized
nature of medicine and health, the drugs in a cluster might not be safe or
effective for a certain patient’s diagnosis, or the patient’s condition might
demand a drug that is not reference priced. For example, the RP program
implemented by Pharmacare in British Columbia, Canada, allows
physicians to apply for a “special authority” exemption from the program
when switching drugs would be inadvisable. 46 So “the physicians can
choose not to switch medications for particular patients if side effects or
other adverse consequences are expected to result. A physician may present
the case to the sick fund, arguing that the patient should be fully refunded,
but the patient may ultimately have to pay the difference in order to receive
a more expensive drug.”47 Certain new innovative drugs that do not fit into
the existing clusters can be exempted in some cases.48 Exemptions work as
a relief valve for patients who might have difficulties switching
medications.49
In countries such as Germany and the Netherlands where reference
groups are defined broadly, the heterogeneity of the medications within
each group increases. 50 The effectiveness of the different drugs within a
group, despite their interchangeability, varies. Exceptions are allowed to
ensure that heterogeneity does not compromise quality. Exceptions have
also been granted when there is a concern of patient frailty or if there is a
record of previous failure with the treatment.51
46

Paul v. Grootendorst et al., Impact of Reference-Base Pricing of Nitrates on
the Use and Costs of Anti-Anginal Drugs, 165 CANADIAN MED. ASSOC. J. 1011,
1012 (2001).
47
DUKES ET AL., supra note 33, at 88.
48
Lisa L. Ioannides-Demos et al., Reference Based Pricing Schemes: Effect on
Pharmaceutical Expenditure, Resource Utilisation and Health Outcomes, 20
PHARMACOECONOMICS 577, 589 (2002).
49
Id. at 583.
50
Stevens Simoens & Sandra de Coster, Sustaining Generic Medicines
Markets in Europe, RESEARCH CTR. FOR PHARMACEUTICAL CARE AND
PHARMACO-ECONOMICS,
68
(2006),
http://www.assogenerici.org/articolihome/simoens-report_2006-04.pdf.
51
Sebastian Schneeweiss et al., Outcomes of Reference Pricing for
Angiotensin-converting-Enzyme Inhibitors, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 822, 823
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B. EFFECTS OF PHARMACEUTICAL RP
In the pharmaceutical sector, RP has been instituted in Germany,
Denmark, Netherlands, Spain, Italy, British Columbia (Canada), New
Zealand, and several other Central and Eastern European countries. Due to
the different RP programs in place in each country and other cost-control
measures instituted by some countries, it is difficult to compare and
generalize the effects of one country’s RP program to others. However,
data collected from different countries has allowed researchers to
understand the short- and long-term effects of RP.
RP has faced criticism and opposition from several groups. The
pharmaceutical industry has opposed RP because it does not take into
account the “unique advantages” of each new drug that demands a higher
reimbursement rate. 52 Physicians and patients have expressed their fears
owing to the unknown health effects that switching a drug might have on
the patient.53 Similarly, payers and health care organizations fear increased
consumption of health care resources by patients who have been asked to
switch to a reference priced drug and who have adverse effects as a result
of the switch.54 Despite many criticisms,55 RP has the potential to become
an effective price control tool. Pharmaceutical prices in the classes of drugs
where RP is implemented have adjusted to the reference price levels.56 RP
has motivated physicians to prescribe and patients to consume less
expensive options, and the robust exceptions process has provided
flexibility for clinical decisionmaking. Also, patient cost sharing has
decreased. 57 More research, however, is needed to better understand the
impact of RP on patient outcomes.
RP has emerged as a policy solution to control the costs of U.S.
(2002).
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Some arguments against using RP in the pharmaceutical industry are that it:
(1) has unfairly harsh effects on people with lower income who cannot afford a
drugs outside the reference-priced clusters, (2) interferes with physician’s clinical
judgment, (3) requires the physician to devote time to getting exceptions to
prescribe non-reference-priced products, (4) can give rise to other health care costs
for patients who might react adversely to switching the drug, (5) introduces a
financial component to the physician-patient relationship, and (6) promotes
inappropriate prescribing. Ioannides-Demos et al., supra note 48, at 587.
56
DUKES ET AL., supra note 33, at 89.
57
Id.
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drug pricing. Its adoption in the domestic market, however, has been
extremely limited. 58 Kroger Co. implemented RP for its prescription
medication program in 2012 and, as a result, experienced $4.3 million in
savings that year. The international experience with RP provides an
evidence base to estimate its potential benefits for the U.S. pharmaceutical
market.59 Some health care experts have recommended RP as “an attractive
policy strategy” to control costs without negatively affecting medication
use or resource consumption. 60 Economists Panos Kanavos and Uwe
Reinhardt, however, have cautioned against overenthusiasm for replicating
the RP system in the US:
Given the importance of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry
to the nation’s and, indeed, the world’s health care
systems, the uncertainty still surrounding the impact of RP
on health care, and the political capital that must be spent
to implement such a system, U.S. public policymakers
probably will want to venture cautiously into this terrain.61
Factors including (1) centralization of the RP system, (2) breadth of
therapeutic clusters of drugs, (3) administrative structures to support such a
program, and (4) effect of RP on the quality, cost, and innovation in health
care have to be carefully examined before the existing RP systems can be
replicated and adopted by the U.S. pharmaceutical market.
C. US HEALTH CARE SERVICES AND PROCEDURES MARKET:
CALPERS, KROGER, AND SAFEWAY
The experience with RP in the pharmaceutical industry prompted
its adoption by a handful of US purchasers of prescription drugs as well as
outpatient, elective procedures. This section will highlight the experience
of a large health benefit provider, CalPERS, with RP as applied to hip and
58
Joy Li-Yueh Lee et al., A Systematic Review of Reference Pricing:
Implications for US Prescription Drug Spending, 18 AM. J. OF MANAGED CARE
e429, e429 (2012).
59
Kate Sullivan, Reference Pricing Saves Insurance, Patients Money, FIERCE
HEALTH
PAYER
(Nov.
19,
2013),
http://www.fiercehealthpayer.com/story/reference-pricing-saves-insurers-patientsmoney/2013-11-19.
60
Li-Yueh et al., supra note 58, at e430, e436.
61
Paul Kanavos & Uwe Reinhardt, Reference Pricing For Drugs: Is It
Compatible With U.S. Health Care?, 22 HEALTH AFF. 16, 28 (2003).
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knee replacement surgeries.
CalPERS is the third largest purchaser of employee health benefits
in the nation offering health benefits to more than 1.3 million public
employees, retirees, and their families.62 CalPERS members include current
and retired employees of the state of California and some local
governments. 63 Employees can choose between three types of plans: (1)
preferred provider organizations (PPOs), (2) health maintenance
organizations (HMOs), and (3) exclusive provider organizations (EPOs)
(limited to members in certain counties in California). 64 More than twothirds of CalPERS members are enrolled in an HMO plan, and all plans
offer separate Medicare supplemental plans for Medicare eligible
members. 65 Seven different providers—Anthem, Kaiser Permanente,
Health Net, Sharp Health Plan, United Healthcare, and CVS Caremark—
provide the health plans offered by CalPERS.66
Seven-and-a-half percent of CalPERS’ total insurance-related costs
were related to joint and muscle conditions, and out of those, ten percent
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Overview,
CalPERS
(Apr.
5,
2012),
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/benefits-overview/health/benefitsoverview.xml (last visited Nov. 30, 2014); Health Benefits, CalPERS (May 20,
2012),
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/benefitsoverview/health/home.xml (last visited Nov. 30, 2014). CalPERS has a total of
1,678,996 members with 1,104,237 active and inactive members and 574,759
retirees, beneficiaries, and survivors receiving a monthly allowance. Facts at a
Glance,
CalPERS,
1
(Nov.
2014),
(http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eipdocs/about/facts/facts-at-a-glance.pdf.
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1
(Nov.
2014),
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/facts/facts-at-a-glance.pdf.
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(Apr.
5,
2012),
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/benefits-overview/health/benefitsoverview.xml.
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Id.
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Currently, CalPERS offers HMO and PPO plans through Anthem.
BlueShield of California offers HMO plans. Health Net offers two HMO plans and
a Medicare Advantage plan for CalPERS retirees in the Southern California region.
Kaiser offers plans for non-Medicare and Medicare enrollees. Sharp Health Plan
offers plans for members in the San Diego County. United Healthcare of California
offers and HMO plan to CalPERS members in some counties in Northern and
Southern California. CVS serves as the pharmacy benefit provider for the PPO and
newly contracted HMO plans. Presenting the CalPERS 2014 Health Plans
Transcript,
CALPERS
(Sept.
2014),
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eipdocs/about/video-web-center/videos/health-benefits/transcript-all-videos.pdf.

2016

REFERENCE PRICING

61

were for routine knee and hip replacements.67 Noting major price variations
within geographic regions, in 2011, CalPERS teamed up with Anthem to
implement RP for its hip and knee replacement procedures covered by
Anthem’s PPO plans. 68 Anthem’s data showed a “fivefold variation in
prices with no measurable difference in quality,” with some hospitals
charging anywhere from $15,000 to $110,000 for hip and knee replacement
surgeries. 69 Relying on this data, while ensuring that sufficient choices
were available to CalPERS’ members, Anthem set a reference price of
$30,00070 for knee and hip replacements.71 The reference price only applied
to the hospital’s facility fee and not to physicians’ fees or fees for other
providers, such as physical therapists.72
Anthem selected forty-one hospitals as “value-based purchasing
design” (VBPD) facilities after determining that the prices those facilities
offered for knee and hip replacements were less than or equal to $30,000,
the quality of care was acceptable, and in the aggregate the hospitals
provided sufficient access to CalPERS members.73 The hospitals classified
as non-VBPD facilities charged more than $30,000 for knee and hip
replacements. Members still had to pay the coinsurance amounts for up to a
maximum of $3,000. 74 If a member chose a facility with a negotiated
reference price of less than or equal to $30,000, he would only have to pay
67

Lechner et al., supra note 9, at 2.
Id.
69
Id.; James C. Robinson & Timothy T. Brown, Increases in Cost Sharing
Redirect Patient Volumes and Reduce Hospital Prices for Surgery, 32 HEALTH
AFF. 1392, 1393 (2013). Lechner et al., supra note 9, at 2. “[E]ven when hospitals’
quality scores—based on readmission rates, infection rates and the rate of revision
of the original surgery—were held constant, the price variation remained.” Id.
70
Medicare on average paid $14,324 for inpatient knee and hip replacements
in 2011. National and State Summaries of Inpatient Charge Data, FY2011,
Microsoft Excel Version, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS.,
http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/Medicare-Provider-Charge-Data/Inpatient2011.html.
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Id.
72
Robinson & Brown, supra note 69, at 1393.
73
Id. at 1393. “Quality measurements included whether the facility had been
accredited by a recognized quality accrediting entity, whether it performed a
sufficient number of joint replacement surgeries annually (because surgical volume
is associated with positive outcomes), and its scores on the surgical prevention
indicators reported by hospitals to the Joint Commission, as well as its
participation in the California hospital quality reporting system and its results
reported by that system.” Id.
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the capped coinsurance amount for the procedure. But if a member selected
a facility with a procedure price of more than $30,000, then he would be
responsible for the gap price in addition to the capped coinsurance
amount.75
As a result of the RP, CalPERS saved $2.8 million in the first year
of implementation and patient cost-sharing decreased by approximately
$300,000.76 An extended examination of the program from 2008 to 2012
and comparison with non-CalPERS Anthem members showed that the RP
program incentivized patients to choose lower-priced facilities.77 Figure 1
shows that in 2010, before the RP program began, forty-eight percent of the
patients chose non-VBPD facilities for hip and knee replacement surgeries,
whereas that number decreased to thirty-seven percent in 2011 after the RP
program began.78 Also, the number of CalPERS members choosing VBPD
facilities increased from fifty-two to sixty-three percent from 2010 to
2011. 79 This increase was not observed for the non-CalPERS Anthem
population. 80 Controlling for other confounding factors, the analysis
concluded that in 2011, RP itself caused a 28.5 percent increase in the
volume for VBPD facilities among CalPERS enrollees.81

75

Id. For example, a member with a ten percent coinsurance who got a hip
replacement at a facility charging $29,000 for the procedure would pay $2,900.
But, if the same member chose a facility that charged $32,000 for the hip
replacement, he would have to pay $3,000 coinsurance amount (ten percent of
32,000 would be $3,200, but that amount is capped at $3,000). Also, the member
would be responsible for the difference between the reference price ($30,000) and
the price the facility charged ($32,000), which is $2,000. So the member will pay a
total of $5,000.
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Lechner et al., supra note 9, at 3.
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Id.
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Robinson & Brown, supra note 69, at 1393.
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Id. at 1393–94.
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Id. at 1394.
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Id. at 1395.
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Figure 1: Patients Choosing non-VBPD (high price) or VBPD (lowprice) Hospitals for Hip or Knee Replacement Surgery, 2008–201282

The RP program also had an effect on hospital prices. Figure 2
shows a comparison between the prices charged by VBPD and non-VBPD
hospitals for knee and hip replacement surgeries from 2008 to 2012. After
the implementation of the RP program in 2011, the average price charged
by the VBPD hospitals decreased by 5.6 percent and then increased
slightly. But, the prices charged by non-VBPD hospitals decreased by 34.3
percent in 2011. 83 Although, in 2011, half of the non-VBPD hospitals
continued to increase their prices and half of them reduced prices, the
average price reductions were “more than twice as large for the facilities
that reduced the prices ($11,048 per patient) [when compared to] the
average price increase for those that increased prices ($4,097).”84 Overall,
hospitals decreased the prices they charged to CalPERS enrollees for hip
and knee replacement procedures.85
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Robinson & Brown, supra note 69, at 1395.
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Id.
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Figure 2: Prices Paid for Knee and Hip Replacement Surgery in VBPD
(low-price) and non-VBPD (high-price) California Hospitals, 2008–
201286

In addition to the cost savings to both CalPERS and its members,
there were positive outcomes for patients’ health. Furthermore, CalPERS
did not observe any evidence of adverse health or quality outcomes for
patients participating in the RP program. 87 The thirty-day general
complication and infection rates and ninety-day follow-up admission rates
were compared for CalPERS members who got hip and knee replacements
in the year before and after the implementation of RP. The analysis found
no significant difference in quality outcomes between the two years. 88
Furthermore, CalPERS members who had their hip or knee replacement
surgeries at a VBPD hospital had “nearly equal or better outcomes” on the
infection and readmission measures when compared with members who
used non-VBPD hospitals.89 After CalPERS’s success with hip and knee
replacements, it extended the program to ambulatory surgical and imaging
86

Id. at 1396.
Id. at 1393.
88
Robinson & Brown, supra note 69, at 1393.
89
Id.
87

2016

REFERENCE PRICING

65

procedures, including cataract surgeries, knee arthroscopies, and
colonoscopies.90 Results from the evaluation of RP’s application to these
additional procedures are not yet available.
With the application of RP to knee and hip replacements, CalPERS
realized modest savings. Even though it did not significantly lower
CalPERS’ overall costs, it provided a solution to reduce the costs of certain
expensive, highly price-variable medical procedures. In addition, RP
helped steer the health care market in the right direction when non-VBPD
hospitals significantly reduced their prices. Granted, some VBPD hospitals
raised their prices slightly, but CalPERS and its employees still realized
overall savings. Overall, the RP program as implemented by CalPERS was
a win-win-win combination resulting in cost-savings for the employer,
price reduction by the hospitals, and benefits for the employees in terms of
lower cost sharing and greater accountability for their health care costs.
Other large employers have also adopted RP as a strategy to lower
costs of their self-insured plans. Kroger Co., one of the world’s largest
retailers, with 375,000 employees, collaborated with WellPoint to set up its
own RP program for radiology services and prescription medications.91 The
radiology program includes services such as abdomen computerized
tomography (CT), pelvic CT, chest CT, brain CT, and spine magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI). 92 Using two years of health claims data, the
company set a reference price for those services while ensuring adequate
access for its employees. 93 It set a reference price of $800 for certain
imaging scans in ten of the thirty-one states where it operates. 94
90

Lechner et al., supra note 9, at 5; The Self-Insured School of California has
also set up its own RP program. Id. at 5. One of the respondents of that program
stated, “Before this program went into place, most members just knew how much
their copays were and how much their deductible was. Some members will look at
the EOB [explanation of benefits], and they are shocked [at the prices hospitals
charge], but most people don’t pay attention to that information. This initiative
brought to light the fact that there are huge differences in prices for procedures,
and you can get most procedures done affordably without sacrificing quality.” Id.
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Kroger calls its RP program “target pricing program.” For consistency, I
will refer to it as RP. Letter from Theresa Monti, Vice President, Corporate Total
Rewards, Kroger Co., to Phyllis C. Borzi, Assistant Secretary of Labor, Employee
Benefits Security Administration (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/faqxix-0017.pdf.
92
Id. at 3.
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Id. at 3–4.
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Similarly, Safeway, a national grocery store chain with 150,000
employees in separate health plans, also implemented its own RP
program.95 Safeway, like CalPERS, also noticed significant price variations
for colonoscopies within certain geographic markets. 96 In San Francisco,
the prices for colonoscopies varied from $848 to $5,984. 97 Safeway
implemented a pilot program in which it set the reference price for
colonoscopies at $1,500. This only included the facility fee; the physicians
were paid according to a uniform fee schedule.98 After the success of its
program, Safeway extended RP to arthroscopy, hernia repair, gall bladder
removal, cardiac catheterization and laboratory tests, and other medical
procedures. 99 Kroger Co., along with CalPERS and Safeway, have
pioneered the application of RP and successfully controlled their rising
health care costs by targeting certain medical services and procedures
which suffer from great price variation.
IV. SHORT AND LONG-TERM CONSIDERATIONS
A. SHORT-TERM CONSIDERATIONS
With the success of RP’s application to medical services and
procedures, large employers now have an evidence base which they can
rely on when implementing their own RP programs. Although
implementing RP can require some initial investment, the long-term
savings and the benefits of implementing a change in the value system of
employees can be enormous. However, RP’s success is contingent on
careful weighing of short- and long-term considerations.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-24/surgery-cost-caps-save-pensionfund-19-without-hurting-health.html.
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James C. Robinson & Kimberly MacPherson, Payers Test Reference
Pricing And Centers Of Excellence To Steer Patients To Low-Price And HighQuality Providers, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2028, 2032 (2012); In 2008, before the
colonoscopy RP program, Safeway implemented RP for pharmaceuticals. Lechner
et al., supra note 9, at 5.
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Robinson & MacPherson, supra note 95, at 2032.
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Id.
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Robinson & MacPherson, supra note 95, at 2032–33. 451 of the 847
laboratory tests covered by Safeway’s benefit plan have been subject to RP. Id. at
2033.
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1. Ensuring Network Adequacy
Maintaining proper network adequacy is a critical area that should
be considered by health plans looking to adopt RP. RP programs should not
be a subterfuge, allowing insurers to create the “appearance of maintaining
a broad network.”100 By reducing the amount that is fully reimbursable for
a certain procedure, an insurer can disincentivize consumers from choosing
the in-network providers that charge more than the reference price. In
essence, an insurer can create smaller networks within the larger innetwork provider sphere
Network adequacy is generally defined by states as “a health plan’s
ability to deliver the benefits promised by providing reasonable access to a
sufficient number of in-network primary care and specialty physicians, as
well as other health care services included under the terms of the
contract.”101 RP programs can blur the line between in-network and out-ofnetwork providers and, therefore, make it difficult to ascertain network
size. By treating in-reference priced providers as out-of-network providers,
RP creates mini networks within the already established network. A
provider that negotiates with the insurer to be considered in-network can be
treated as out-of-network for a reference-priced procedure while still being
in-network for other procedures and services. It is important to note that so
far, only large employers with self-insured plans have implemented RP.
Self-insured plans are not subject to state regulations relating to health
insurance102 and “there are no federal network adequacy standards for large
group health plans and no state or federal network adequacy standards for
self-insured group health plans.”103 These mini networks-within-networks
for reference priced procedures are generally immune from network
adequacy requirements.
Glaudemans et al. raise concerns with the unregulated nature of
network adequacy for self-insured plans implementing RP. 104 First, RP
programs have the potential to confuse customers since they have to
100
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at
https://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/faq-xix-0012.pdf.
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Sally McCarthy & Max Farris, ACA Implications for State Network
Adequacy Standards, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. (2013), available at
http://www.rwjf.org/en/research-publications/find-rwjf-research/2013/08/acaimplications-for-state-network-adequacy-standards.html.
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navigate the in-network and out-of-network lists and also the referencedpriced provider list. 105 This confusion can hamper customers’ ability to
access medical services, and the access problem can be worsened if
consumers receive insufficient information.106 Second, “[p]lans may seek to
develop broad networks with seemingly generous payment rates, only to
subsequently adopt aggressive reference pricing structures that render the
seemingly generous contracts moot.” 107 This strategy can undermine
consumers’ ability to choose a plan that includes their regular providers and
create uncertainty as to which provider is in-network or out-of-network.
Lastly, there is concern that the traditional methods of assessing network
adequacy based on “ratios, totals, and drive times”—number of primary
care providers in a given population or service area, appropriate mix of
community hospitals and tertiary care facilities, and distance a patient has
to drive to access a particular specialty—might not be adequate to assess
the adequacy of mini RP networks.
Having sufficient providers participate and become a part of the
reference-priced networks is not only critical for consumer choice but also
for RP’s mainstream adoption in to the health care system.
2. Quality of Care
Quality of care has to be carefully balanced when finding providers
to participate in RP programs. The fear is that, in choosing a provider for
the RP program, an insurer’s choice will be based on whether a provider
offers a price at or below the reference price without considering the
quality of care provided. Measuring quality of care108 is not an easy task,109
105

Id.
Id.
107
Id.
108
“High-quality care” has been defined by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) as
“care that is safe, effective, patient-centered, timely, efficient, and equitable (with
no disparities between racial or ethnic group).” Christina Bielaszka-DuVernay,
Improving Quality and Safety, 33 HEALTH AFF., 1, 2 (2011).
109
Robert H. Brook et al., Defining and Measuring Quality of Care: A
Perspective from US Researchers, 12 INT. J. FOR QUALITY IN HEALTH CARE 281,
281 (2000); Elizabeth A. McGlynn, Six Challenges in Measuring the Quality of
Health Care, 16 HEALTH AFF. 7, 7 (1997) (“patients, providers, and payers each
define quality differently, which translates into different expectations of the health
care system and thus differing evaluations of its quality”); Measuring and
Improving Quality of Care: A Report From the American Heart
Association/American College of Cardiology First Scientific Forum on Assessment
106
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Although measuring quality in health care is not a new endeavor, the
development of proper, effective measures has been slow.110
The concern about quality has to be addressed on two levels: (1) in
selecting procedures for which price variation is not related to variation in
quality, and (2) in measuring quality of providers within the referencepriced network. For example, in deciding the connection between price and
quality for hip and knee replacement surgeries, CalPERS examined the
difference in quality scores for hospitals charging prices ranging from
$15,000 to $110,000 and looked at the hospitals’ readmission rates,
infection rates, and rates of revision of the original surgery. 111 Also,
CalPERS monitored the quality of providers within the reference-priced
network. It looked at the reference-priced “hospital’s quality based on
accreditation by recognized quality accrediting entities, whether the
hospital performed a sufficient number of joint replacement surgeries
annually, and the hospital’s scores on surgical prevention indicators, as
well as participation in California’s hospital quality reporting systems.”112
This provided CalPERS with the means to measure quality variation for
purposes of RP among the broader provider base and within the reference
price network to ensure that the quality of care its members were receiving
was not inadequate and would not negatively impact its members’ health.
CALPERS’ experience can serve as a starting point in thinking about
of Healthcare Quality in Cardiovascular Disease and Stroke, AM. HEART ASS’N
1484–1485
(2000),
available
at
http://circ.ahajournals.org/content/101/12/1483.full.pdf+html
(Defining
the
methodological challenges in measuring health care quality).
110
The National Committee for Quality Insurance’s Healthcare Effectiveness
and Data Information Set Standards (HEDIS) are used by health plans to track
quality and services. Christina Bielaszka-DuVernay, supra note 108, at 2. The
National Quality Forum, a nonprofit organization formed at the recommendation of
the President’s Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in
Health Care Industry, has “certified 34 separate health care practices and
procedures to be effective in reducing the occurrence of adverse events.” Id. The
Joint Commission, a private nonprofit organization, accredits hospitals and other
health care organizations. Id. For a discussion of the improvements to be made in
the area of quality measurements in health care, see Improving Health Care
Quality: The Path Forward, Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 113th
Cong. 1 (2013) (statement of Mark B. McClellan, Dir., Engelberg Ctr. for Health
Care Reform, Brookings Inst.).
111
Letter from Robert Restuccia, supra note 100; James Robinson & Kimberly
MacPherson., Payers Test Reference Pricing And Centers Of Excellence To Steer
Patients To Low-Price And High-Quality Providers, 31 HEALTH AFFAIRS (2012).
112
Id.
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effective and efficient ways of measuring and monitoring quality in RP
programs.
3. Adequacy of the Reference Price
The reference price should be set at a level that encourages
provider participation, does not limit access to care, and allows the issuer to
attain cost savings.113 But setting the price inappropriately low can have the
following adverse consequences: (1) the consumer will pay more out-ofpocket for the procedures above the reference price; (2) with time, hospitals
will lower their price and join the RP program; (3) participating hospitals
will increase the prices for other services and procedures not subject to RP;
(4) there will be “consolidation among providers, which will increase
negotiating power among providers”; or (5) RP programs will fail due to
insufficient provider participation and increased patient cost-sharing.114 If
the reference price is set too high, it will provide an abundance of choices
for the consumer but it will not lead to maximization of savings, as desired
by the plan sponsor.115 Community Catalyst suggested that the reference
price should be “set high enough so that the price reflects what the
majority of high-quality providers within that region charge for care.”116
With these limitations and with the great variation in prices for procedures
around the nation in mind, prices for RP programs for services and
procedures have to be set locally or regionally.117 Some organizations have
even warned against setting a reference price across states because
providers will negotiate higher prices in regions where they have
significant market power. 118 Reference prices will be a critical factor in
ensuring a meaningful choice for the consumers and RP’s success in the
long term.
4. Consumer Education
Consumer education is the keystone of RP’s success because it
ensures that participants have the necessary tools to make informed
113
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decisions when choosing providers for procedures and services subject to
RP. For example, before an insured consumer enters into a plan, he should
be informed by the insurer of the procedures subject to RP, the reference
price for each procedure, the amount in excess of the reference price that
does not fall under the insurer’s definition of out-of-pocket costs, and what
does and does not count towards the annual out-of-pocket maximums.119
Furthermore, before a consumer receives a service that is subject to RP, the
insurer should inform him as to which providers charge at or below the
reference price, 120 the reference price for that service and the insured’s
obligation if a higher priced provider is chosen, and guidance on requesting
an exception from the RP program.121
5. Exceptions
Allowing exceptions prevents consumers from being subject to RP
if they do not have the time or ability to make a price-sensitive decision,
and also provides flexibility to the RP program to accommodate the
individualized nature of health and sickness. Consumers suffering from
certain serious conditions might require referenced-priced procedures and
services from providers who are not in the reference-priced network.
Providers treating patients with chronic conditions need to be involved in
the management and treatment of the chronic condition in order to ensure
continuity of care. Exceptions should also be allowed for patients whose
health conditions require services of a non-reference-priced provider or
specialist.
Additionally, RP programs should allow for exceptions if a
patient’s health needs or circumstances require him to see a non-reference
priced provider for a reference-priced procedure. An exceptions process
should include a case-by-case evaluation with fair outcomes. The specific
119
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Illinois Dep’t of Ins., to U.S. Dep’ts of Labor, Health and Human Servs, and
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situations that will give rise to the granting of an exception might be
different under each program. For example, American Cancer Society
(ACS) and Families USA suggested that exceptions should be available in
situations in which requiring the consumer to choose a provider within the
reference price would harm the consumer’s care coordination,122 cause the
consumer to travel a great distance to go to that provider, or involve long
wait times for the consumer. 123 The individualized nature of health and
health care requires that RP programs incorporate a process by which a
patient’s case can be evaluated on an individual basis.
Additionally, exceptions should be granted for a consumer
receiving an emergency procedure and who might not have the time or
ability to browse reference-priced providers. 124 That is why CalPERS
excluded any emergency knee or hip replacement surgeries received by an
employee from the restrictions of the RP program. 125 Lastly, exceptions
should be considered when a consumer’s health conditions or
complications require more costly care services and procedures that are not
provided by every healthcare facility or provider.126 For many consumers,
especially with certain co-morbidities or serious health conditions,
continuity of care trumps cost savings.
B. LONG-TERM CONSIDERATIONS
Besides the concerns that the current RP programs raise, there are
many larger concerns that need to be addressed when deciding the longterm viability of RP. RP is a blunt mechanism for cutting health care costs
that needs to be carefully implemented with a proper evaluation of both
short- and long-term considerations.
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1. Rewarding Efficiency and Quality
Even though the main goal of RP is to reduce and control the rising
cost of health care services, it does not adequately focus on efficiency.
After a reference price has been set, there is a perverse incentive for
hospitals already charging below the reference price to increase their prices
to match the reference price. This phenomenon was seen in the CalPERS
experiment where the VBPD hospitals that were already charging less than
$30,000 for hip and knee replacements raised their prices after the RP
program was put in place.127 RP will, however, motivate hospitals charging
more than the reference price to bring down their prices. As Amanda
Lechner et al. stated, RP “is a ‘blunt instrument’ that excludes providers
with the highest prices but does not reward extremely efficient
providers.”128 This phenomenon is similar to what has been observed in the
Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS). Under the PPS, provider
reimbursement is based on paying the same rate for the same services by
categorizing health care services into diagnostic related groups (DRGs). 129
Karen Davis and Stuart Guterman explained:
Such a system of payment rewards those hospitals and
physicians that efficiently produce those units of care
(hospital stays and physicians’ visits and procedures)
because they can pocket any difference between the fixed
price they are paid for each unit and the amount it costs
them to produce it. The main disadvantage of this approach
is that although it rewards providers for producing each
127

Robinson & Brown, supra note 69, at 1396; “The benefit design does not
reward the provider that charges $15,000 any more than the provider that charges
$30,000.” Lechner et al., supra note 9, at 8.
128
Lechner et al., supra note 9, at 8.
129
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patient care, including routine nursing services, room and board, and diagnostic
and ancillary services. The CMS creates a rate of payment based on the “average”
cost to deliver care (bundled services) to a patient with a particular disease. The
DRG rates do not expressly include direct medical education costs, outpatient
services, or services covered by Medicare Part B . . . The DRGs classify all human
diseases according to the affected organ system, surgical procedures performed on
patients, morbidity, and sex of the patient.” Medicare Hospital Prospective
Payment System: How DRG Rates are Calculated and Updated, OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 5 (Aug. 2001),
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unit of care efficiently, it also rewards providers for
producing a greater quantity of services, even if the same
or better patient outcomes could be achieved with fewer
services or a less expensive combination of services. As a
result, Medicare’s payment policy still does not encourage
efficiency in its overall provision of care over time or over
an episode of illness.130
In the PPS, payments do not reward efficiency but instead pay for the care
provided. Similarly, in an RP program, once the reference price is set,
already-efficient hospitals charging below the reference price have no
incentive to keep costs at that level, or try to become even more efficient,
because of the reference price guarantee. Additionally, the outcome of the
procedure or quality of care provided does not change the level of payment
that the hospital will receive for a reference-priced procedure. The pricesaving potential of RP should be carefully weighed against efficiency and
quality of care.
2. Preventing Disruption of Continuity of Care
RP’s effect on continuity of care is especially critical for patients
with chronic conditions. Although there are multiple definitions of
continuity of care, it has several accepted dimensions: informational
continuity, chronological or longitudinal continuity, geographic continuity,
interdisciplinary continuity, interdisciplinary or team-based continuity, and
family continuity. 131 RP brings into question informational continuity,
chronological or longitudinal continuity, and team-based continuity.
Informational continuity is defined as “the availability of patient
information to providers throughout a healthcare system.”132 With slower
than expected acceptance and use of electronic health record systems
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Medicare Payments, 85 THE MILIBANK Q. 449, 451 (2007).
131
John W. Saultz, Defining and Measuring Interpersonal Continuity of Care,
1 ANNALS OF FAM. MED. 134, 136 (2003). (Geographic continuity is defined as
“care that is provided with continuity regardless of the location of the patient
(office, home, hospital, etc.).” Interpersonal continuity refers to a “special type of
longitudinal continuity in which an ongoing personal relationship between the
patient and care provider is characterized by personal trust and responsibility”).
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Gina Agarwal & Valorie A Crooks, The Nature of Informational Continuity
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within hospitals,133 it is difficult to imagine how the flow of information
between reference-priced providers and a patient’s regular providers will
allow continuity of care. Chronological or longitudinal continuity is
defined as “a patient seeing the same provider over time and developing a
relationship based upon trust.”134 Since laboratory and imaging services—
some of the common services subjected to RP—are generally not
performed by a patient’s usual physician, the disruption of care might not
be an issue if RP is applied to those services. For hip and knee replacement
surgeries, however, the relationship of trust that a patient establishes with
his or her provider before the surgery is essential to a patient’s decision
when and where to get the surgery. In addition, a patient’s care can be
disrupted when he receives the pre-surgery care and the surgery itself from
different providers who might not be able to effectively share the patient’s
information. This could have harmful effects on the patient’s health and
post-surgery care. The same problem exists with the lack of team-based
continuity. Team-based continuity is defined as “care that allows previous
knowledge of the patient to be present even when the patient requires a
wide range of services spanning the traditional medical specialties.”135 If a
the patient’s usual provider is not part of the same team as the referencepriced provider who performs the surgery that causes a disruption in teambased continuity.
These scales of continuity of care play an even more significant
role for patients with chronic conditions and the elderly. For example, a
person suffering from Ulcerative Colitis would prefer that his regular
gastroenterologist performs the colonoscopy to check his colon and look
for any signs of tumor formation. If this specialist does not work for a
reference-priced hospital, then the patient will have to make an unfair
choice between having his specialist perform the colonoscopy and paying
the gap price or choosing a reference-priced provider and disrupting the
care and management of his chronic condition. Continuity of care is
essential for the management of chronic conditions and RP can hinder that
133
Only twelve percent of the 2,952 hospitals surveyed “had instituted
electronic physicians’ notes across all units,” and only seventeen percent of the
hospitals has “computerized provider-order entry for medications was reported as
having been implemented across all clinic units.” Ashish K. Jha et al., Use of
Electronic Health Records in U.S. Hospitals, 360 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 1628, 1631
(2009).
134
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135
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flow if RP is blindly applied to all categories of patients.
A study conducted by Mainous III and Gill found that continuity of
care with a clinician decreases the likelihood of future hospitalizations.136
Also, continuity with a provider has been found to be more important than
continuity with a health care site.137 Patients with a continuous relationship
with their physicians are “more satisfied with their care, are more likely to
take medications correctly, and are more likely to have problems identified
by their physician.” 138 Besides these benefits, continuity of care is
significantly associated with decreased emergency department visits.
Having continuity of care is important for patients, especially those
suffering from chronic conditions, 139 and forcing consumers to obtain
procedures from reference-priced providers, if different from their regular
providers, might compromise the continuity of care their illness demands.
Health plans looking to adopt RP should consider whether and to what
extent continuity of care will be affected for procedures and services
subject to RP and how to prevent patients with chronic health conditions
from disruption of care.
3. Improving Cost Savings
RP can compromise continuity and efficiency of care for cost
savings. But, if those cost savings are insignificant, they do not provide an
incentive to insurers to use such a harsh cost-cutting tool and spend the
time, effort, and money to institute an RP program. A recent study
conducted by the Center for Studying Health System Change (CSHSC)
showed that RP for “shoppable health care services” will only lead to
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modest savings.140 The study quantified the share of spending attributable
to “shoppable health care services” and simulated the effect of RP on those
services. 141 The study analyzed RP for both inpatient and outpatient
services using 2011 enrollment and claims data from 528,000 active and
retired nonelderly U.S. autoworkers and their dependents.142 The study was
limited to nineteen metropolitan markets in the Midwest, each with at least
4,000 enrollees.143
While imaging and laboratory tests accounted for 13.9 percent of
total health care spending in the claims data, the savings, after applying RP
to the shoppable imaging and laboratory services, accounted for only 1.9
percent of total spending.144 Savings for other shoppable services did not
look too promising: inpatient hospital stays: 0.6 percent; outpatient hospital
services/ambulatory procedures and physician office visits: 2.1 percent;
uncomplicated hip and knee replacements: 0.2 percent; and all other
shoppable services: 4.8 percent.145 Overall, regardless of the percentage of
total spending that the procedure accounted for, the resulting savings, after
applying RP to those procedures, were minimal.146 Generalizing from these
findings, the authors of the study cautioned against drawing broad
conclusions from CalPERS’ success with RP because even though there
was “a dramatic percentage decline in prices and spending on knee and hip
replacements,” there was only “an extremely small percentage decline in
total spending.” 147 Despite the capped contribution approach for highly
price-variable procedures, RP might not have a significant impact on the
health plan sponsors’ total spending. However, the study did not discourage
140
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using RP as a tool to cut health care costs; instead, it recommended
applying RP to broader categories of procedures, realizing that RP can be
“a useful step on the path to more reasonable pricing.” 148 If RP is being
touted as a cost-saving tool, evidence of small savings casts doubt on its
usefulness and viability. But, greater cost savings will be realized as more
employers and insurers adopt RP, the number of procedures subject to RP
increases, and RP is combined with payment reform strategies.149
4. Monitoring Potential Cost Shifting
RP’s potential to shift costs should be closely monitored to prevent
its negative effects on affordability of care. The fact that RP can be used as
a way to shift costs from providers to consumers is a matter of concern.150
But, this cost shifting can be prevented if consumers are provided sufficient
information to understand RP and choose providers within the reference
price.151
However, another type of cost shifting is more nuanced and not
addressed by RP.152 In order to understand this cost-shifting phenomenon,
let’s look at an example. A health plan has decided to impose a reference
price of $30,000 on hip replacements. An area hospital lowers its price for
that procedure from $40,000 to $30,000 in order to keep its market share
and prevent losing the health plan’s customers. That hospital can make up
that difference of $10,000 by increasing the price of one or more
procedures that are not capable of being reference priced, such as
emergency cardio thoracic surgery. This cost shifting seems natural for a
hospital to do but it also chips away at one of the goals of RP—to lower
prices of health care services by reducing the amount paid to providers.
148
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See infra Section V.
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Also, consumers do not stand to benefit in the end when on one hand, they
save money by choosing a reference-priced provider for a reference-priced
service, while on the other, they are the targets of balanced billing for an
emergency, non-reference-priced procedure.
Lastly, there is cost shifting from facility to non-facility charges. In
the CalPERS RP experiment, the “$30,000 payment limit applied only to
the hospital’s allowed charges, not to the fees charged by the surgeons and
other physicians involved in the patient’s care.” 153 Facility fees typically
account for seventy-five to eighty percent of the total cost of joint
replacements.154 With only the facility fee subject to RP, hospitals have an
incentive to shift some of the cost to physician fees, especially since
hospitals are buying out physician practices and increasing their nonfacility charges.155
With multiple levels of cost shifting, health plans need to evaluate
RP’s effects on affordability of care for consumers because if cost shifting
is not controlled, the “balloon effect” of RP will lead to minimal overall
savings for the health care system.
5. Price Transparency: Availability and
Comprehensibility
One of the important pillars of a RP program is price
transparency—making price information available to consumers so they
can make informed choices. However, the gaps in price data can hinder
both the flow of information necessary for consumers to make educated
153
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decisions and the success of RP programs. Without proper price and quality
data, RP programs can push consumers into making tough health care
decisions without appropriate information.
Price transparency is “the availability of provider-specific
information on the price for a specific health care service or set of services
to consumers and other interested parties.” 156 Price information should
ideally include a consumer’s total cost for health care services—any
negotiated discounts; all fees for the facility, physician, lab, and other fees;
out-of-pocket costs, including co-payments, coinsurance amounts,
deductibles; and the gap price.157 But the problem is that “[e]ven very large
plans will lack the historical data to accurately measure the prices they
typically pay to smaller hospitals.”158 Some of the transparency tools used
by health plans are limited because of the pressure from the providers with
whom they negotiate, the operational challenges they face with respect to
the data, and the limitations of existing consumer portals.” 159 Therefore,
price information might not be that easily accessible to a health plan itself.
That further hinders consumers’ access to that information.
Price transparency should accompany information about the quality
of care provided at the reference-priced facilities. After equipping
consumers with the information they need, it is important that the
information readily available at the time of purchasing and is presented in
an understandable way. Helping consumers realize that high prices do not
necessarily mean better quality and that some of the lower-priced hospitals
often have high quality scores160 requires displaying price and quality data
156
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side-by-side. Also, providing independent information about quality will
allow consumers to consider the cost of care of services and not rely solely
on their physician’s advice.161 Creating an infrastructure that can obtain and
support such information will require a significant investment, which might
be a deterrent for employers planning to adopt RP programs.
In addition to initial consumer education about a RP program,
continued support should be available for consumers to understand this
new layer of complexity. Differentiating between in-network, out-ofnetwork, referenced-priced-in-network providers, and non-reference-pricein-network providers will be a difficult task, even if applied to non-urgent
procedures. Some form of assistance should be available to consumers to
choose from and between reference-priced providers that best suit their
health and financial concerns. Those who adopt RP must keep these longterm considerations in mind to ensure RP’s continued success, prevention
of any adverse effects on consumers, and widespread adoption by health
plans.
V. VARIATIONS OF RP
As the health care industry works to develop standards to evaluate
the current RP programs, it is important to keep in mind how RP programs
can work with the emerging health delivery and payment models. Some
variations improve the current RP programs, while others are designed to
lift RP from a mere cost-saving tool to an important component of the
payment delivery system.
Unlike CalPERS, Kroger Co.’s RP program included both the
facility fees and professional charges.162 This prevented any cost shifting
between the different fees and allowed consumers to see the total cost of a
reference-priced procedure. This method, however, does not prevent
providers from shifting costs to other post-procedure services, and it falls
short of taking RP out of its role as a benefit-design mechanism and placing
it alongside the payment reform tools. But it is important to note that costhttp://www.hreonline.com/pdfs/06022012Extra_ThomsonReutersStudy.pdf; Anna
D. Sinaiko & Meredith B. Rosenthal, Increased Price Transparency in Health
Care — Challenges and Potential Effects, NEW ENG. J. MED. 891, 892 (2011)
(“The belief that higher-cost care must be better is so strongly held that higher
price tags have been shown to improve patients’ responses to treatments through
the placebo effect”).
161
Sinaiko & Rosenthal, supra note 160, at 892.
162
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82

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 22.1

shifting between different fees can be reduced if most of the costs and fees
associated with a procedure can be included in the reference price.
Similarly, RP can be applied to a single or multiple CPT163 codes, thereby
allowing the health plan to inform consumers of their finite costs. However,
with complex procedures involving multiple CPT codes, a patient can be
left with a large bill even if he or she chooses a reference-priced provider.
Francois de Brantes et al. points out:
For example, a physician might decide to perform multiple
diagnostic imaging tests prior to and after the procedure, or
to select different types of imaging tests than some of their
peers. Similarly, after the procedure, the orthopedist might
recommend a stay at a rehabilitation facility, while another
might recommend a few sessions of physical therapy.
Finally, the price might vary depending on the setting in
which the plan member receives the service. As such, the
price, mix, and frequency of services in a joint replacement
procedure can vary, even when adjusting for the severity of
the patient. 164
This problem can be solved if RP is coupled with payment reform
mechanisms, such as bundled payments. A bundled payment “is a single
payment to providers or health care facilities (or jointly to both) for all
services to treat a given condition or provide a given treatment.”165 It shifts
the risk to the providers for the cost of services for a particular treatment or
condition and any resulting preventable complications. 166 Providers are
protected in case of serious complications in which they have to incur
unexpected costs. Since it is a single payment to the provider, it lends itself
163
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to be a natural partner of RP. According to Catalyst for Payment Reform,
“[c]oupling a reference pricing strategy with a bundled payment to
providers for the entire episode of care could make pricing easier and
create alignment among consumers, employers, and providers in a number
of ways.” 167 As with the current RP program, a consumer will select a
provider that offers a reference-priced bundle and the consumer will only
incur out-of-pocket costs if he chooses a provider with a higher priced
bundle.168
This combination of RP and bundled payments can result in
“alignment” between the provider, the insurer, and the insured. 169 It will
also allow for cost predictability for both the insurer and the consumer.170
Another benefit will be greater provider accountability for defined
outcomes and financial liability for the provider for costs above the
bundled reference price.171 Additionally, by including a stop loss cap at the
95th percentile of costs, the employee and the provider can be protected
from catastrophic out-of-pocket expenses resulting from factors outside of
their control.172 Due to the administrative complexities,173 legal hurdles,174
and required technological capabilities,175 bundled payments have not been
widely accepted, despite their cost-saving potential.
In addition to bundled payments, Catalyst for Payment Reform
predicts that RP will be incorporated with other payment reform methods,
including centers for excellence contracting176 and global payments.177 RP
167
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has the potential to become a valuable cost-saving tool, but its limitations
need to be recognized and monitored closely. The Department should start
by taking a closer look at the current RP programs to assess whether RP is
a strategy that is compatible with the goals of the evolving health care
system.
VI. CONCLUSION
RP is an effective benefit-design model that is helping to bend the
health care cost curve. Andrea Caballero, Program Director at the Catalyst
for Payment Reform, perfectly stated that even though RP is a “short-term
fix,” it is “one of the few short-term fixes that is actually seeing positive
results.”178 With its success in both the international pharmaceutical market
and the U.S. market for medical procedures and services, it has proven its
potential as a cost-saving device. But, it has its limitations, in terms of
scope and application, that must be recognized so that regulators
overseeing its implementation can effectively track its progress, monitor its
effect on access, cost, and quality of care, and allow its incorporation into
new payment reform mechanisms. While the health care system should be
wary of new strategies which can potentially impact consumers’ access to
affordable, high-quality care, bending the cost curve will require disruptive
innovations that can transform the power dynamics in the health care
marketplace.
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